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A recurrent theme in the literature on business cycle fluctuations is the impor-
tance of expectational shocks that change the beliefs of agents concerning the future
level of aggregate activity, but that do not reflect real movements in the fundamen-
tals. For example, shocks to “animal spirits” or “swings in optimism and pessimism”
figured prominently in the writings of macroeconomists of an earlier era, such as
Keynes [1936] and Pigou [1929; 1949]. More recently, the literature on sunspot equi-
libria, such as Azariadis [1981], Cass and Shell [1983], and Woodford [1987], and mac-
roeconomic models characterized by strategic complementarity, such as Diamond
[1982], Bryant [1983], and Cooper and John [1988], both suggest that aggregate activ-
ity can be significantly affected by movements in expectations that do not reflect real
movements in the fundamentals.1 This paper identifies a source of the type of shock
suggested to be of significance by the above literatures. In particular, we employ the
American Statistical Association-National Bureau of Economic Research (ASA-NBER)
Survey of Forecasts by Economic Statisticians to measure expectations concerning
future growth in the economy, and demonstrate that errors in the initial announce-
ments of the index of leading economic indicators are an important source of this type
of expectational shock.
In the literatures mentioned above, the expectations of agents concerning “other”
agents’ production plans are a determinant of future aggregate activity. That is, if all
agents suddenly revised upwards their beliefs concerning the production plans of other
agents—even if there were no change in any real variable—the result would be a type
of self-fulfilling increase in the future level of production. The intuition behind this
result is easiest to see in the literature concerning strategic complementarity. A mac-
roeconomic model that exhibits strategic complementarity is simply one in which the
higher is aggregate production, the larger is the incentive for any individual agent to
produce. Suppose that in such a world all agents were to become more optimistic76 EASTERN ECONOMIC JOURNAL
concerning the production plans of other agents. Even if this did not reflect a change
in the fundamentals of the economy, the result would be an increase in actual planned
production levels and a subsequent increase in future aggregate activity.
The obvious place to look for shocks that affect expectations concerning future
aggregate activity is at those pieces of information agents employ in trying to predict
future activity. In the U.S. economy there are many sources for such information. For
example, Data Resources Incorporated (DRI) and Wharton Econometric Forecasting
Associates (WEFA) are commercial firms that specialize in predicting future aggre-
gate activity. Also, the widely publicized index of leading economic indicators is an
index of economic variables purposefully constructed to signal changes in the direc-
tion of future aggregate activity. In this paper we focus on the initial announcements
of the index of leading indicators and, in particular, on the errors in those initial
announcements. The reason we focus on the errors in the initial announcements
rather than on the initial announcements themselves is that, although the initial
announcements are likely to be correlated with movements in the real fundamentals
of the economy, the errors in the initial announcements are unlikely to be correlated
with those movements.
One can get a measure of the error component of an initial announcement con-
cerning the leading indicator index because of the revision process associated with the
index. The way the index works is that for each monthly number there is an initial
announcement and then a series of revisions. By looking at the difference between
the initial announcement and the final announcement one can get a measure of the
error associated with the initial announcement. For example, if the initial announce-
ment concerning this month’s number is 150 and the final announcement is 151, then
we have an estimate of the error associated with the initial announcement equal to –1.
To investigate the importance of these errors on movements in expectations con-
cerning future aggregate activity, we employ the ASA-NBER Survey of Forecasts by
Economic Statisticians. This is a quarterly survey of forecasters’ predictions concern-
ing the U.S. economy. The advantage of using this survey to measure expectations,
rather than, say, a survey of consumer or business confidence, is that our goal is to
identify shocks that change the beliefs of agents concerning future aggregate activity
and this survey specifically focuses on beliefs concerning the future. Our empirical
analysis looks at the period 1968-1990 and asks whether the errors in the initial announce-
ments of the leading indicator index were a source of expectational shocks during this
period and, in particular, whether they were a more important source of expectational
shocks after 1976.
As explained in more detail later, the main reason for investigating whether there
was a change after 1976 is that the method of construction of the index changed after
1976 in a way that should have made the initial announcements of the index better
predictors of future activity. That is, since agents should have relied more heavily on
the initial announcements after 1976 to the extent they were better predictors of
future activity after this date, we have the prediction that the errors in the initial
announcements of the index should be a more important source of expectational shocks
after 1976. Our first finding is that prior to 1976 the errors in the initial announce-
ments of the leading indicator index are either not a source of expectational shocks or
a relatively unimportant source. Our second finding, however, is that after 1976 these77 LEADING INDICATORS AS A SOURCE OF EXPECTATIONAL SHOCKS
errors have both an economically significant as well as a statistically significant effect
on movements in expectations concerning future aggregate activity. In other words,
we find that after 1976 these errors are an important source of the type of shock
central to the analyses of Keynes, Pigou, and a number of more recent authors.
This paper is related to Oh and Waldman [1990]. In that paper, we explored the
relationship between revisions of the leading indicator index and movements in future
production and found evidence of both a statistically significant and economically sig-
nificant negative relationship. Our interpretation was that the errors in the initial
announcements of the leading indicator index are a source of expectational shocks.
Here, we directly test whether these errors are a source of expectational shocks by
investigating the relationship between these revisions and movements in expecta-
tions concerning future aggregate activity as measured by the ASA-NBER Survey of
Forecasts by Economic Statisticians, and find evidence consistent with our earlier
interpretation.
Similarly to the above discussion, Matsusaka and Sbordone [1995] argue that if an
economy is characterized by strategic complementarity, then movements in expecta-
tions that are independent of real movements in the fundamentals should be a deter-
minant of aggregate output. They test this hypothesis by running Granger causality
tests on vector autoregressions of GNP, consumer sentiment, and other series that
are good predictors of GNP. Their results support the idea that such movements in
expectations are an important determinant of aggregate activity.
In interpreting their results, Matsusaka and Sbordone [1995] do not make any sug-
gestions concerning potential sources for the type of expectational shock they focus on.
The main point of this paper is that after 1976 errors in the initial announcements of
the index of leading economic indicators are an important source of this type of
expectational shock. That is, errors in the initial announcements of the leading indi-
cator index are likely to be uncorrelated with real movements in the fundamentals,
yet after 1976 they are important determinants of expectations concerning future
output.
As a final introductory point, in thinking about our findings in this paper one
might be tempted to say “of course” and “so what.”  The “of course” refers to the idea
that forecasters should consider all relevant information in forming forecasts, so it is
not surprising that the initial announcements of the leading indicator index matter
and, in turn, that the errors in those initial announcements also matter. The “so
what” refers to the idea that, given that it is not surprising that the initial announce-
ments and the errors in those initial announcements matter, why are the results in
this paper of interest?
We agree with “of course” but disagree with “so what.”  That is, we feel it is quite
intuitive and therefore not surprising that initial announcements and errors in the
initial announcements matter. Rather than thinking this makes the paper uninterest-
ing, however, we believe it makes it more interesting. To the extent that the finding
is intuitive, it is natural to put more weight on its validity. Further, if, as we argue
here, forecasters do indeed consider initial announcements in making forecasts and
are thus affected by the errors in those announcements, then it would also not be
surprising for those errors to be an important source of business cycle fluctuations as78 EASTERN ECONOMIC JOURNAL
we argued in our earlier paper. In turn, it should be obvious that this second conclu-
sion is indeed an important one.
The outline for the paper is as follows. The second section discusses the available
evidence concerning the predictive power of the initial announcements of the leading
indicator index. The third section describes our data and empirical methodology. The
fourth section presents an empirical analysis of the relationship between errors in the
initial announcements of the leading indicator index and movements in expectations
concerning future aggregate activity. In the fifth section we discuss the various theo-
retical mechanisms that could explain our findings. The last section presents conclud-
ing remarks.
THE PREDICTIVE POWER OF THE INITIAL ANNOUNCEMENTS OF THE
LEADING INDICATOR INDEX
The idea of an index of leading economic indicators for use in business cycle fore-
casting was originally developed by Mitchell and Burns [1938] at the National Bureau
of Economic Research. Despite the fact that since its inception the approach has faced
frequent criticism for the lack of a theoretical underpinning such as found in Koopmans
[1947], it has continually grown in importance. Responsibility for the index was moved
from the NBER to the U.S. Department of Commerce in 1968, and in recent years the
initial announcement of a monthly value of the index has been widely reported in both
the popular and financial presses.2
An important issue from our perspective is the predictive power of the initial
announcements of the index. Saying that the errors in the initial announcements of
the leading indicator index constitute an important source of expectational shocks
implies that individuals rely on the initial announcements as a useful tool for predict-
ing future activity. This is more likely to the extent that the initial announcements
have strong predictive power concerning future activity. Most studies of the predictive
power of the leading indicator index look at final announcements rather than initial
announcements. In terms of final announcements, the consensus is that the index
provides a significant incremental contribution in standard forecasting approaches,
such as linear prediction of industrial production based on lagged values of production,
and commonly estimated vector autoregressions.
As suggested, however, from our perspective, studies of the predictive power of
the final announcements of the leading indicator index are of limited interest. Employ-
ing final announcements is looking at information not available to individuals trying
to forecast future activity on the basis of initial announcements, so these studies
likely overstate the usefulness of initial announcements for forecasting purposes. A
study that is more relevant given our interests is that of Diebold and Rudebusch
[1991]. Rather than employing final announcements, they use the leading indicator
numbers that were available at the dates of the forecasts. This weakens the predictive
power of the index and, more importantly, for predicting future levels of industrial
production they find that including the index in forecasting specifications no longer
improves forecasting performance.79 LEADING INDICATORS AS A SOURCE OF EXPECTATIONAL SHOCKS
One factor that Diebold and Rudebusch [1991] do not incorporate into their analy-
sis is that over the years the U.S. Department of Commerce periodically changed the
method, that is, the identity of the individual components and the weights, with which
it constructed the index. One possibility is that these changes improved the predictive
power of the initial announcements in later years. Of particular interest is a series of
changes instituted in 1975 and 1976. A comparison of the discussion in Moore and
Shiskin [1967, Ch. 2] with that in Zarnowitz and Boschan [1975] indicates that, rela-
tive to the criteria employed in choosing components for the index prior to these
changes, the post-1976 criteria placed more weight on choosing components for which
the initial announcements would be good predictors.
To be more precise, Moore and Shiskin [1967] describe the criteria employed prior
to the changes in 1975 and 1976. They state that the magnitude of revisions is one of
a number of criteria used in judging the statistical adequacy of a potential component
indicator, where statistical adequacy is itself one of six general criteria used in “scor-
ing” potential components. In contrast, Zarnowitz and Boschan [1975] describe the
criteria employed beginning with these changes. They state “...because business fore-
casters must use preliminary estimates in lieu of   the as yet unknown final values,
series that are subject to large revisions which frequently involve directional changes
are particularly troublesome. For this reason such series, regardless of their statisti-
cal adequacy score, are not included in the composite index of leading indicators”
[Zarnowitz and Boschan, 1975, vii]. Clearly, a change in criteria for choosing compo-
nents of the type described could have had a significant impact on the predictive power
of the initial announcements.
In Oh and Waldman [1990], we investigated whether this change in the criteria for
choosing components had an effect on the predictive power of the initial announce-
ments. Our finding was that the predictive power of the initial announcements improved
substantially after 1976. In particular, prior to 1976 the initial announcements of the
leading indicator index only had significant ability for predicting growth rates for the
first quarter following the announcement dates, while after 1976 the initial announce-
ments had significant ability for predicting growth rates for the first three quarters
following the announcement dates.3
Overall, the evidence concerning the predictive power of the initial announce-
ments of the leading indicator index is mixed. Diebold and Rudebusch [1991] find that
starting from predictions based on lagged values of production, the leading indicator
numbers available at the dates of the forecasts had no incremental value for forecast-
ing future levels of production. Our own earlier analysis suggests that, to the extent
the initial announcements had positive value, the value was higher after 1976. Hence,
judged from the standpoint of the evidence concerning the predictive power of the
initial announcements of the leading indicator index, one does not have a strong prior
concerning whether the errors in these initial announcements are likely to be a source
of movements in expectations concerning future aggregate activity. What we show in
the following sections, however, is that, despite the mixed evidence concerning pre-
dictive power, more direct evidence indicates that after 1976 the errors in the initial
announcements of the leading indicator index are in fact an important source of such
expectational shocks.80 EASTERN ECONOMIC JOURNAL
DATA AND METHODOLOGY
This section begins by describing the data we employ in our empirical analysis.
We then discuss our empirical methodology. The following sections present the analy-
sis and a discussion of possible interpretations of our results.
Data
In describing our data the first step is to describe the revision process for the
index of leading economic indicators.4 During the time period we study (see Note 2), at
the end of each month the Bureau of Economic Analysis at the U.S. Department of
Commerce (BEA) made an initial announcement for the previous month’s value of the
index, and announced revised values of the index for each of the preceding eleven
months. In addition, on an occasional basis the whole series was revised back to 1948.
The revisions fall into three categories. The first category consists of revisions due to
changes in the unadjusted values of one or more of the component series. We will
refer to this category as data revisions. Such revisions occur for a number of reasons.
First, as time passed the BEA received better information due to larger and/or more
representative samples. Second, for some of the component series there was no infor-
mation available at the time of the initial announcement.5 Third, methods of seasonal
adjustment also lead to data revisions.
A second category of revisions consists of revisions due to changes in statistical
factors. In computing the index of leading economic indicators the BEA made a num-
ber of statistical adjustments. For example, to prevent more volatile component series
from dominating the index, values of each component series were adjusted so that the
average percentage change did not vary across component series. There was also a
standardization procedure that equalized the long-run average of the leading indicator
index with the long-run average of the coincident indicator index, and a trend adjust-
ment procedure that equalized the trends of the two indexes. Over time the BEA
updated these statistical factors, and new revisions were then calculated using the
updated values.
The third category of revisions consists of what we will refer to as definitional
revisions. Over time the BEA made changes to the definition of the leading indicator
index. Such changes include changes in the identity of the component series, changes
in the weights assigned to the various components, and changes in the definitions of
specific component series. There have been a number of definitional changes over the
years, with major definitional changes occurring on average approximately once every
two years. As with changes in statistical factors discussed above, when there was a
definitional change new revisions were calculated using the updated definition.
For our purposes, it is only the data revisions that are of interest. The reason is
that it is only the data revisions that are a measure of the errors associated with the
initial announcements. In constructing our revision variable, we thus adjusted the
data to eliminate the effects of both definitional revisions and revisions due to changes
in statistical factors. The specific procedure we employed to adjust the revision data is
as follows. We first identified every quarter for which, between the initial announce-
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change in the method of construction of the index due either to a change in the defini-
tion of the index or a change in statistical factors. For each such quarter, we then took
the first announcement of that quarter’s number made after the change in the method
of construction of the index and divided that number by the last announcement made
prior to the change. The resulting ratio measures the proportional change in that
quarter’s value of the leading indicator index due to the change in the method of
construction of the index. We then multiplied the initial announcement of that quarter’s
value of the leading indicator index by this ratio, and used the resulting number in
constructing the revision variable. Adjusting an initial announcement in this way
yields a value for the revision that is an unbiased estimate of that part of the total
revision due to data revisions.
In our empirical analysis we employ two variables constructed from the leading
indicator series. As will be discussed in more detail shortly, we look at quarterly
series even though announcements are monthly because our data on expectations is
quarterly in nature. Let At
F be the true or final announcement of the index in quarter
t, and let At
I be the initial announcement of the index in quarter t (given the adjust-
ment process described above). The first variable we employ is It
F, which is the true
or final announcement of the quarterly growth rate of the leading indicator index in
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Our data on expectations is from the ASA-NBER Survey of Forecasts by Economic
Statisticians. This is a quarterly survey of professional forecasters’ predictions con-
cerning future aggregate activity. The survey asks for predictions concerning a vari-
ety of economic variables including industrial production for each of several quarters
following the forecast date. We employ the mean forecasts to construct measures of
expected growth in industrial production for each of several quarters beyond the fore-
cast date.6 Our focus will be on the mean value in quarter t of the forecasted growth
rate in industrial production for quarter t + j, which we denote as Et(IPt+j).7 Our analy-
sis covers the fourth quarter of 1968 to the first quarter of 1990.8
Methodology
Our goal is to capture the effect that initial announcements of the leading indica-
tor index and, in particular, the errors in those initial announcements have on expec-
tations of future aggregate activity. To better understand our focus consider Figure 1.
This figure captures how, if expectational shocks are important, the initial announce-
ments of the leading indicator index would affect future aggregate activity. That is,
suppose that there was an increase in an initial announcement of the leading indica-
tor index but no change in any real variable. We would expect this to cause experts to
increase their forecasts of future aggregate activity which, in turn, would cause con-
sumers and producers to become more optimistic concerning future aggregate activ-
ity. The subsequent final result is then an increase in future aggregate activity itself.82 EASTERN ECONOMIC JOURNAL
FIGURE 1
Initial Announcements Expert Forecasts Consumer and Producer Future
of Leading Indicator ⇒ of Future ⇒ Expectations of ⇒ Aggregate
Index Aggregate Future Aggregate Activity
Activity Activity
One might at first think that the way to test for this effect is to consider the
correlation between the initial announcements of the leading indicator index and expert
forecasts concerning future aggregate activity, between the initial announcements
and consumer and producer expectations concerning future aggregate activity, and
between initial announcements and future aggregate activity itself. But there is a
problem with this approach. The initial announcements of the leading indicator index
are positively correlated with the true or final announced values of the index and
these final announced values are purposefully constructed to be correlated with move-
ments in future aggregate activity. Hence, it is quite possible that, even if the announce-
ment effect described above did not exist, there would still be a positive correlation
between initial announcements of the leading indicator index and future aggregate
activity. Further, since expert forecasts and consumer and producer expectations are
likely to be correlated with future aggregate activity, even without an announcement
effect there could also be a positive correlation between initial announcements and
both expert forecasts and consumer and producer expectations.
The alternative approach that we took in Oh and Waldman [1990] and will also
take here is to decompose the initial announcements of the leading indicator index
into its components—the final announced values for the index and the revisions. In a
multiple regression analysis with both of these components as independent variables,
a negative correlation between the revisions and expert forecasts, between the revi-
sions and consumer and producer expectations concerning future aggregate activity,
and between the revisions and future aggregate activity itself would be evidence of the
announcement effect described above. The reason is that a higher value for the revi-
sion holding the final announced value constant translates into a lower value for the
initial announcement with no change in the final announced value. In Oh and Waldman
[1990] we considered the correlation between the revisions and future aggregate activ-
ity and found that after 1976 there was a statistically and economically significant
negative correlation. Here we consider whether there is also a statistically and eco-
nomically significant negative correlation between the revisions and expert forecasts
of future aggregate activity.
With the above in mind we begin our empirical analysis with a regression specifi-
cation of the following form:
(1) E IP b b E IP b I b R e tt j t t j t
F
tt +− + − () =+ () +++ 121 1 3 4 ,
where et is an error term. The dependent variable Et(IPt + j) is the forecast from the
survey taken after but closest in time to the release of the initial announcement of the
leading indicator index in quarter t. The timing is best understood through an example.
Let quarter t be the October-December quarter. The leading indicator variables we
use are the ones corresponding to the initial announcement of the December number,83 LEADING INDICATORS AS A SOURCE OF EXPECTATIONAL SHOCKS
which is in fact announced at the end of January. Et(IPt + j) is the mean expectation
from a survey sent out in the middle of February, for which the respondents return
their forecasts over the next three weeks. The earliest forecasted growth rate we
consider is the one corresponding to the April-June quarter. By focusing on the initial
announcement that occurs prior to but closest in time to the date of the survey, we
are attempting to avoid any indirect effect that the initial announcement might have
on the forecast. For example, if there was a longer time period between the announce-
ment and the forecast, then the forecast could potentially reflect forecasters’ observa-
tions of how producers are responding to the announcement. Our specification is intended
to minimize this effect and only capture the direct effect of the announcement on the
forecast.9
In considering Equation (1) the reader might initially be concerned that the final
announcement of the leading indicator index, At
F, which is used to construct both It
F
and Rt, is not known at the time that forecasts are being made. Hence, the equation
seems to be testing for the effect that variables unknown at the time of the forecasts
have on the forecasts. But this is in fact not the case. The initial announcement is
known at the time of the forecasts and the components of the initial announcement
are the true value of the index and the error in the initial announcement. What we
are doing, therefore, is including what is observed but breaking it up into its compo-
nents: i) the true value, which is measured by  It
F; and ii) the error in the initial
announcement, which is measured by –Rt. As described in detail below, by doing this
we get a better understanding of the extent to which forecasters rely on these initial
announcements and the extent to which errors in these initial announcements matter.
In interpreting our results there are three main alternative hypotheses. The first
hypothesis is that respondents do not consider the initial announcements in forming
their expectations, and the information that the respondents do consider is uncorrelated
with both It
F and Rt. This hypothesis predicts b3 = 0 and b4 = 0. The second hypothesis
is that respondents do not consider the initial announcements, but the information
that the respondents do consider is positively correlated with It
F but there is no corre-
lation with Rt. This hypothesis predicts b3 > 0 and b4 = 0. Finally, the third hypothesis
is that respondents consider the initial announcements, in which case the prediction
is b3 > 0 and b4 < 0. The logic for this prediction is described informally above and more
formally as follows.
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−1 fixed, an increase
in It
F given no change in Rt translates into an increase in both At
F and At
I, while an
increase in Rt given no change in It
F translates into no change in At
F and a decrease
in  At
I. In other words, from a multiple regression standpoint the coefficient on  It
F
captures how forecasts change when the initial announcement is higher due to a
higher true value, while the coefficient on Rt captures how forecasts change when the
initial announcement is lower due to a lower value for the error in the initial announce-
ment. Hence, if the respondents consider At
I in forming their expectations, we have84 EASTERN ECONOMIC JOURNAL
that It
F should be positively correlated with expectations while Rt should have a nega-
tive correlation.
There is, of course, a fourth alternative hypothesis, which is that respondents do
not consider the initial announcements, but the information they do consider is posi-
tively correlated with It
F and negatively with Rt. As with the third hypothesis above,
this hypothesis predicts b3 > 0 and b4 < 0. Although this hypothesis is a theoretical
possibility, given the nature of the errors that cause the revisions, we feel that this
hypothesis is unlikely to be correct.10 The errors we are focusing on are due mostly to
the fact that initial announcements are based on the incomplete sampling of the BEA,
and we feel it is unlikely that the respondents would acquire information from other
sources that is correlated with the errors caused by this incomplete sampling.
We end this section with two additional points concerning our methodology. First,
our methodology relies on initial announcements of the leading indicator index being
rational forecasts of the true values of the index. That is, to the extent that initial
announcements are not rational forecasts, then initial announcements can be improved
upon and the revision may be a biased measure of the error transmitted through an
initial announcement. We can get information concerning this issue by looking at the
mean and standard deviation of the revision and the correlation coefficients between
It
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revision are –0.005 and 0.023 for the full sample, –0.012 and 0.035 for the pre-1976
subsample, and –0.001 and 0.009 for the post-1976 subsample, while the correlation
coefficients between It
I and Rt are 0.096 for the full sample, 0.095 for the pre-1976
subsample, and 0.097 for the post-1976 subsample (we consider these three samples
because later tests focus on these three). This evidence indicates that the initial announce-
ments are either rational forecasts of the true values or at least very close to rational
forecasts. Note that Diebold and Rudebusch [1988] also considered this issue and found
that, similar to our conclusion, there is a bias in the revision but that in practice this
bias is small.
Second, one drawback of this methodology is that it does not distinguish between
“real” and “sunspot” reasons for why forecasters might consider the initial announce-
ments of the leading indicator index in forming their expectations. To see what we
mean here, suppose we were to find b3 > 0 and b4 < 0 and the correct interpretation
was the third hypothesis above, that is, respondents consider the initial announce-
ments of the index in forming their expectations. There are still two possibilities for
what is happening. The first is that an initial announcement contains real information
about fundamentals and thus agents pay attention to initial announcements in order
to find out what that information is. The second is that initial announcements serve
as a pure sunspot. That is, an initial announcement contains no information about
fundamentals but agents pay attention to the initial announcements anyway because
each agent (correctly) believes that other agents pay attention. We come back to this
issue later when we discuss how one should interpret our findings.85 LEADING INDICATORS AS A SOURCE OF EXPECTATIONAL SHOCKS
TESTS
This section presents the results of a series of tests based on the empirical meth-
odology presented in the previous section. Table 1 reports results of a regression
analysis of Equation (1) for j = 2,...,5. The regressions reported in Table 1 provide
evidence that there is indeed a negative correlation between revisions of the leading
indicator index and contemporaneous movements in expectations concerning future
growth rates. The coefficient on the revision variable has the predicted sign in all four
regressions. Further, looking at the coefficients individually, we see that the coeffi-
cient for j = 2 is statistically significant at approximately the 90 percent level, while for
j = 3 and 4 the coefficient is significant at the 95 percent level.
In contrast, the results concerning  It
F are weaker. For this variable the coeffi-
cient has the predicted sign in only two of the four regressions, and in only one of
these is it significant at standard levels. The weak results concerning It
F are possibly
due to a multicollinearity problem between It
F and the lagged value for expectations.
Another possibility discussed in detail in the following section is that agents “overre-
act” to surprises, where this could lead to the results found in Table 1 if there is a high
correlation between the revisions of the leading indicator index and the surprises
associated with the initial announcements. Given the weak results concerning It
F, in
the tests that follow we focus on the coefficients on the revision variable.
TABLE 1
The Impact on Professional Forecaster Expectations
of the Revision of the Leading Indicator Indexa
j = 2 3 4 5
Intercept 0.002 0.002 0.002 0.002
(1.97)b (1.97) (1.98) (2.31)
Et – 1(IPt + j – 1) 0.605 0.759 0.843 0.810
(6.74) (8.91) (11.73) (10.08)
It
F 0.112 0.024 –0.018 –0.023
(2.85) (0.78) (0.94) (1.11)
Rt –0.069 –0.063 –0.048 –0.021
(1.66) (2.00) (2.17) (0.78)
Adj. R2 0.56 0.61 0.70 0.63
a. Et(IPt + j) = b1 + b2Et – 1(IPt + j – 1) + b3It
F + b4Rt + et. Et(IPt + j) denotes the mean value from the ASA-NBER
Survey of Forecasts by Economic Statisticians of the forecasted growth rate in industrial production for
quarter t + j, where the forecast is from the survey taken after but closest in time to the release of the
initial announcement of the value of the leading indicator index for quarter t.  It
F  denotes the true
growth rate of the leading indicator index in quarter t and Rt denotes the revision of the leading
indicator index in quarter t.
b. t-statistics are reported inside the parentheses.86 EASTERN ECONOMIC JOURNAL
In Table 1 we focused on how announcements affect forecasts of quarterly growth
rates. Another way to analyze the data is to consider forecasts over longer time peri-
ods. That is, do our results get weaker or stronger when we focus on predictions of
growth over a number of quarters rather than a single quarter? We consider this
issue in Table 2. In particular, the dependent variable is now the forecasted cumula-
tive growth in industrial production from quarter t + 2 through quarter t + j, while our
independent variables are still the lagged value for expectations, the final announced
value of the leading indicator index, and the revision. The table indicates that when
we aggregate the forecasted growth rates across quarters we find stronger evidence of
a negative correlation between revisions of the leading indicator index and contempo-
raneous movements in expectations. Specifically, when we aggregate across each of
two and three quarters the coefficient on the revision variable is negative and statis-
tically significant at the 95 percent level, while when we aggregate across four quar-
ters the coefficient is negative and significant at the 99 percent level.
TABLE 2
The Impact on Professional Forecaster Expectations
of the Revision of the Leading Indicator Indexa
(the dependent variable aggregated over quarters)
j = 3 4 5
Intercept 0.004 0.004 0.004
(1.92)b (1.64) (1.34)
Et – 1(∆IPt + j – 1) 0.716 0.815 0.890
(8.43) (10.55) (12.53)
It
F 0.121 0.067 –0.025
(1.89) (0.89) (0.30)
Rt –0.134 –0.178 –0.289
(2.04) (2.34) (3.35)
Adj. R2 0.62 0.70 0.77
a. Et(∆IPt + j) = b1 + b2Et – 1(∆IPt + j – 1) + b3It
F + b4Rt + et. Et(∆IPt + j) denotes the mean value from the ASA-
NBER Survey of Forecasts by Economic Statisticians of the forecasted cumulative growth in industrial
production from quarter t + 2 through quarter t + j, where the forecast is from the survey taken after
but closest in time to the release of the initial announcement of the value for the leading indicator index
for quarter t.  It
F  denotes the true growth rate of the leading indicator index in quarter t and Rt denotes
the revision of the leading indicator index in quarter t.
b. t-statistics are reported inside the parentheses.
Another interesting set of tests concerns breaking up the sample into subperiods.
As discussed earlier, relative to the criteria employed in choosing components for the
leading indicator index prior to 1976, in the post-1976 time period the U.S. Depart-
ment of Commerce placed more weight on choosing components for which the initial87 LEADING INDICATORS AS A SOURCE OF EXPECTATIONAL SHOCKS
announcements would be good predictors. Further, there is some evidence that indi-
cates that in the later time period the initial announcements of the index were indeed
better predictors. This suggests an additional test to perform. To the extent that the
initial announcements of the index were better predictors after 1976, we would expect
that in making forecasts of future activity individuals would have placed more weight
on these initial announcements in the later time period. In turn, if this is the case,
then the negative correlation between revisions of the leading indicator index and
contemporaneous movements in expectations should be stronger in the later time
period.
Before proceeding, it is worth pointing out that there is a second reason for con-
ducting the following set of tests. As discussed briefly in the Introduction and in the
second section, in Oh and Waldman [1990] we investigated the relationship between
the revisions of the leading indicator index and future movements in aggregate activ-
ity. We found both a statistically significant and economically significant negative
relationship between these two variables, with  this negative relationship being much
stronger after 1976. Our interpretation was that errors in the initial announcements
of the leading indicator index serve as a source of expectational shocks, and these
shocks in turn cause subsequent movements in aggregate activity. Further, we hypoth-
esized that the reason the negative relationship was stronger after 1976 is that agents
paid more attention to the initial announcements of the index after 1976, and thus a
given error in an initial announcement translated into a larger movement in expecta-
tions in the post-1976 time period. Below we explore whether this interpretation of
our earlier results is correct by directly testing how errors in the initial announce-
ments of the leading indicator index affect expectations in the pre-1976 and post-1976
time periods.
In Table 1, we considered the correlation that holds for the full sample between
revisions of the leading indicator index and contemporaneous movements in expecta-
tions of future quarterly growth rates, and found evidence of a statistically significant
negative correlation. In Table 3 we run the same test broken down by time period.
The table indicates that for each of j = 2, 3, and 4 the coefficient on the revision
variable is larger in absolute value and has a higher degree of statistical significance
in the later time period than either in the earlier period or in the full sample. Further,
it is worth noting that for each of j = 2 and 3 the coefficient on the revision variable in
the later time period is statistically significant at the 99 percent level.
In Table 2, we ran a test similar to that in Table 1 with the major change being
that the dependent variable was an aggregate of growth rates across quarters. We
found that when we aggregate the growth rates across quarters the coefficient on the
revision variable is consistently negative and statistically significant. Table 4 runs the
same test broken down by time period. Consistent with the findings of Table 3, the
coefficients on the revision variable are larger in absolute value and have a higher
degree of statistical significance in the later time period. Overall, our empirical analy-
sis indicates that, consistent with the findings in Oh and Waldman [1990], the errors
in the initial announcements of the leading indicator index were a more important
source of expectational shocks in the post-1976 time period.1188 EASTERN ECONOMIC JOURNAL
TABLE 3
The Impact on Professional Forecaster Expectations of the
Revision of the Leading Indicator Indexa
Broken Down by Time Period
Pre-1976 Subsample Post-1976 Subsample
j =  2 345 j = 2 3 4 5
Intercept 0.004 0.003 0.002 0.002 0.001 0.001 0.002 0.003
(1.45)b (1.44) (1.36) (1.16) (0.97) (1.13) (2.03) (2.22)
Et – 1(IPt + j – 1) 0.533 0.616 0.806 0.837 0.730 0.861 0.791 0.733
(3.22) (3.76) (6.05) (7.24) (7.17) (9.87) (8.93) (6.45)
It
F 0.103 0.076 0.001 0.003 0.093 –0.017 –0.027 –0.042
(1.32) (1.28) (0.02) (0.11) (2.17)  (0.55) (1.14) (1.46)
Rt –0.020 –0.069 –0.049 –0.032 –0.355 –0.252 –0.155 –0.061
(0.27) (1.29) (1.45) (1.21) (3.78) (3.77) (2.64) (0.77)
Adj. R2 0.47 0.46 0.65 0.73 0.67 0.74 0.71 0.55
a. Et(IPt + j) = b1 + b2Et – 1(IPt + j – 1) + b3It
F + b4Rt + et. Et(IPt + j) denotes the mean value from the ASA-NBER
Survey of Forecasts by Economic Statisticians of the forecasted growth rate in industrial production for
quarter t + j, where the forecast is from the survey taken after but closest in time to the release of the
initial announcement of the value for the leading indicator index for quarter t.  It
F  denotes the true
growth rate of the leading indicator index in quarter t and Rt denotes the revision of the leading
indicator index in quarter t.
b. t-statistics are reported inside the parentheses.
TABLE 4
The Impact on Professional Forecaster Expectations
of the Revision of the Leading Indicator Indexa
(the dependent variable aggregated over quarters)
Broken Down by Time Period
Pre-1976 Subsample Post-1976 Subsample
j = 3 4 5 j = 3 4 5
Intercept 0.006 0.006 0.010 0.002 0.003 0.004
(1.36)b (1.14) (1.11) (0.97) (1.17) (1.31)
Et – 1(∆IPt + j – 1) 0.640 0.778 0.848 0.822 0.849 0.865
(4.06) (5.43) (5.74) (9.09) (10.56) (11.24)
It
F 0.156 0.113 –0.011 0.064 0.020 –0.043
(1.26) (0.79) (0.06) (0.95) (0.27) (0.50)
Rt –0.088 –0.134 –0.208 –0.630 –0.785 –0.813
(0.78) (1.06) (1.39) (4.43) (4.83) (4.40)
Adj. R2 0.53 0.63 0.63 0.74 0.79 0.80
a. Et(∆IPt + j) = b1 + b2Et – 1(∆IPt + j – 1) + b3It
F + b4Rt + et. Et(∆IPt + j) denotes the mean value from the ASA-
NBER Survey of Forecasts by Economic Statisticians of the forecasted cumulative growth in industrial
production from quarter t + 2 through quarter t + j, where the forecast is from the survey taken after
but closest in time to the release of the initial announcement of the value for the leading indicator index
for quarter t.  It
F  denotes the true growth rate of the leading indicator index in quarter t and Rt denotes
the revision of the leading indicator index in quarter t.
b. t-statistics are reported inside the parentheses.89 LEADING INDICATORS AS A SOURCE OF EXPECTATIONAL SHOCKS
Tables 1 through 4 establish that the errors in the initial announcements of the
index of leading economic indicators have a statistically significant impact on contem-
poraneous movements in expectations. In Table 5 we consider whether the impact of
these errors is also economically significant by looking at the proportion of the vari-
ability in expectations that can be explained by the revision variable. As in Tables 2
and 4, the dependent variable we employ is the forecast for the growth in industrial
production aggregated across quarters. The table reports results for the full sample,
the pre-1976 subsample, and the post-1976 subsample.
Before describing our approach, let us briefly discuss why we do not employ a
variance decomposition approach. The reason is that a variance decomposition would
likely capture an indirect effect that errors in the initial announcements of the lead-
ing indicator index have on the forecasts. As described below, the only revision included
in our analysis is the revision that corresponds to the initial announcement of the
leading indicator index that immediately precedes the forecast. Thus, our approach
should only capture the direct effect that the errors in the initial announcements of
the leading indicator index have on the forecasts. In contrast, in a variance decompo-
sition, in addition to the revision variable included in our approach, the analysis would
include revisions that correspond to the initial announcements of the leading indica-
tor index that occurred significantly before the forecast. Thus, rather than only cap-
turing the direct effect that the errors in the initial announcements of the leading
indicator index have on the forecasts, a variance decomposition would also capture
forecasters’ observations of how producers respond to errors in the initial announce-
ments of the leading indicator index.
Consider the variability in expectations not explained by a one-period lag in expec-
tations—we will refer to this as the residual variability. One can think of the residual
variability as a rough estimate of the variability in expectations not explained by the
information held by agents one quarter earlier. In Table 5 we calculate the incremen-
tal contribution of the revision variable through a comparison of R2 values as described
in Theil [1971], and then use this number to calculate the proportion of the residual
variability that is explained by the revision variable.12 There are two points worth
noting. First, the table indicates that, in general, the more quarters we aggregate
across, the larger is the proportion of the residual variability that is explained by the
revision variable. Second, consistent with the findings reported in Tables 3 and 4, the
revision variable explains a larger proportion of the residual variability in the later
time period. For example, when we aggregate the growth rates across four quarters,
the revision variable explains 12.9 percent of the residual variability in the full sample,
while it explains 8.1 percent in the pre-1976 subsample and 27.9 percent in the post-
1976 subsample. Overall, our analysis indicates that the errors in the initial announce-
ments of the index of leading economic indicators have both an economically signifi-
cant as well as a statistically significant effect on contemporaneous movements in
expectations.
As a final point, it should be noted that there is an alternative explanation for our
findings. In the above discussion, we interpret our results as indicating that in making
their forecasts economic forecasters place significant weight on the initial announce-
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place significant weight on the initial announcements of the index, but rather place
weight on the initial announcements of one or more of the component series used to
construct the index. Although it is an alternative explanation for our findings, in
terms of the underlying argument there is really no important difference. Even if the
correct explanation is that the forecasters place significant weight on the initial announce-
ments of one or more of the component series used to construct the index rather than
the index itself, our findings still indicate that errors in initial announcements con-
cerning economic statistics are a source of the type of shock central to the analyses of
Keynes, Pigou, and more recent authors such as Diamond and Woodford. Or, to put
this another way, whichever explanation is correct, our results suggest that
expectational shocks due to errors in initial announcements concerning economic
statistics are an important factor in understanding how expectations concerning future
growth evolve over time.
TABLE 5
The Explanatory Power for Contemporaneous Movements in
Expectations of the Revision of the Leading Indicator Indexa
Full Sample Pre-1976 Subsample Post-1976 Subsample
kj   = 2 3 4 5 j = 2 3 4 5 j = 2 345
1 0.533 0.615 0.686 0.720 0.470 0.552 0.652 0.607 0.575 0.647 0.689 0.717
2 0.563 0.619 0.688 0.740 0.519 0.569 0.652 0.646 0.593 0.647 0.695 0.737
3 0.579 0.639 0.709 0.776 0.520 0.579 0.666 0.678 0.691 0.754 0.799 0.816
4 3.4% 5.2% 6.7% 12.9% 0.2% 2.2% 4.0% 8.1% 23.1% 30.3% 33.4% 27.9%
a. The numbers for k = 1 are the values for R2 from the estimation of Et(∆IPt + j) = b1 + b2Et – 1(∆IPt + j – 1) + et.
The numbers for k = 2 are the values for R2 from the estimation of Et(∆IPt + j) = b1 + b2Et – 1(∆IPt + j – 1) +
b3It
F+ et. The numbers for k = 3 are the values for R2 from the estimation of Et(∆IPt + j) = b1 + b2Et – 1(∆IPt + j – 1)
+ b3It
F + b4Rt + et. The numbers for k = 4 are the values for [(row 3 – row 2)/(1 – row 1)]•100. Et(∆IPt + j)
denotes the mean value from the ASA-NBER Survey of Forecasts by Economic Statisticians of the
forecasted cumulative growth in industrial production from quarter t + 2 through quarter t + j, where
the forecast is from the survey taken after but closest in time to the release of the initial announcement
of the value for the leading indicator index for quarter t.  It
F  denotes the true growth rate of the leading
indicator index in quarter t and Rt denotes the revision of the leading indicator index in quarter t.
INTERPRETATIONS
The above analysis shows that the errors in the initial announcements of the
index of leading economic indicators serve as a type of expectational shock, while our
previous analysis shows that these shocks are an important source of business cycle
fluctuations. But there is still the important question, what is the underlying theoreti-
cal mechanism that translates the errors in the initial announcements of the leading
indicator index into subsequent movements in aggregate activity? As suggested in the
Introduction and in Section II of Oh and Waldman [1990], our preferred explanation is
that the economy is characterized by strategic complementarity, where strategic
complementarity means that each agent has a higher incentive to produce when he or91 LEADING INDICATORS AS A SOURCE OF EXPECTATIONAL SHOCKS
she believes that future aggregate activity will be high. The logic here is that a posi-
tive error, for example, causes each agent to raise his or her expectations concerning
the production plans of other agents, and, due to strategic complementarity, this in
turn causes each agent to in fact produce more.
But the presence of strategic complementarity is not the only possibility for how
errors in the initial announcements of the leading indicator index could get translated
into subsequent movements in aggregate activity. For example, these errors might be
important not because there is strategic complementarity, but because the economy
is characterized by aggregate cost shocks and each agent wants to produce more when
his or her costs are low. In this explanation, information about the current aggregate
cost shock is dispersed among various producers in the economy. In turn, agents pay
attention to the initial announcements of the leading indicator index and thus the
errors matter because the index aggregates this dispersed information in a way that
allows each producer to better predict his or her own costs.13
As discussed in the third section, a related issue is that even if strategic
complementarity is important there are still two possibilities. On the one hand, agents
may look at the initial announcements of the leading indicator index because these
announcements contain information about the real fundamentals of the economy. In
this case the errors in the initial announcements are important because errors mat-
ter in almost any learning context in which important information is announced but
measured with error. On the other hand, the initial announcements of the leading
indicator index may serve as a pure sunspot, that is, each agent considers the initial
announcements not because they capture any information about real fundamentals
but because other agents are looking at the announcements. In this case the errors
are important because together the agents’ behavior creates a self-fulfilling prophecy,
that is, because each agent acts as if the initial announcements are important, the
announcements and the errors in those announcements become important.
In considering the above possibilities we believe there are strong reasons to favor
the idea that the economy is characterized by strategic complementarity. For example,
as discussed by Cooper and Haltiwanger [1996], the predictions of models character-
ized by strategic complementarity match a number of real-world business-cycle prop-
erties, such as co-movement of activity across sectors and positive serial correlation of
various aggregate time series. Further, there are a number of historical episodes,
such as the response of the economy to the 1933 National Industrial Recovery Act,
that suggest an important role for strategic complementarity. Finally, we do not believe
there is much evidence at this point that would allow one to distinguish between the
idea that the initial announcements of the leading indicator index contain information
about the real fundamentals of the economy and the idea that they serve as pure
sunspots. As discussed briefly in the Conclusion, we believe that trying to resolve this
issue is an important avenue for future research.
We will end this discussion by mentioning one final possibility. All the theoretical
mechanisms discussed above assume that agents form their expectations in a fashion
consistent with Bayesian learning or rational-expectations-type learning. Another
possibility is that the economy is characterized by strategic complementarity but fore-
casters “overreact” to surprises, as suggested by research in experimental psychology,92 EASTERN ECONOMIC JOURNAL
such as Kahneman and Tversky [1982], and in behavioral economics, such as De Bondt
and Thaler [1985]. The reason we suggest this as a possibility is that overreaction
potentially explains a puzzling aspect of our empirical findings. As discussed briefly at
the beginning of the empirical analysis, a puzzling aspect of our findings is that the
coefficient on the revision variable is consistently negative and statistically significant
but we do not find evidence for the corresponding prediction that the coefficient on the
true or final announced value of the leading indicator index should be positive. One
possibility is that this is due to a multicollinearity problem. As discussed below, another
possibility is that forecasters overreact to surprises.
Suppose that, as must be the case, prior to an initial announcement concerning
the leading indicator index forecasters have expectations concerning what that initial
announcement will be. Further, let overreaction mean that each forecaster does not
pay attention to the initial announcement itself in putting together his or her forecast
but rather is only concerned with the difference between the actual initial announce-
ment and his or her prior expectation concerning that announcement, that is, each
forecaster only considers the surprise contained in the initial announcement. This
would explain the puzzling aspect of our findings if the correlation between the errors
in the initial announcements and the surprises in the initial announcements is higher
than the correlation between the true values for the leading indicator index and the
surprises.14 Further, we would expect the former correlation to be higher than the
latter since forecasters’ expectations concerning initial announcements of the index
should be positively correlated with the true values for the index but, given the source
of the errors, uncorrelated with the errors.
CONCLUSION
In Oh and Waldman [1990] we found both a statistically significant and economi-
cally significant negative relationship between revisions of the index of leading eco-
nomic indicators and movements in future production. The interpretation we posited
is that errors in the initial announcements of the leading indicator index are a source
of expectational shocks. In this paper, we employed the ASA-NBER Survey of Fore-
casts by Economic Statisticians to measure expectations, and directly investigated
whether these errors are a source of expectational shocks. Our findings indicate that
after 1976 the errors in the initial announcements of the index of leading economic
indicators are indeed both an economically significant as well as a statistically signifi-
cant source of expectational shocks.
As discussed, for example, in Basu and Taylor [1999], much of the current empiri-
cal work on business cycle fluctuations focuses on the importance of monetary shocks
and technology shocks as causes of these fluctuations, and ignores the possibility of
expectational shocks, which is central to the theoretical literatures concerning sun-
spots and strategic complementarities. Between this paper and our earlier 1990 analy-
sis, we have identified a source of expectational shocks and shown that these shocks
serve as an important source of business cycle fluctuations. Further, given that there
are likely other similar sources of expectational shocks (such as the errors in the
initial announcements of other government statistics), our work suggests that the93 LEADING INDICATORS AS A SOURCE OF EXPECTATIONAL SHOCKS
empirical literature on the sources of business cycle fluctuations needs to pay more
attention to the possible role of expectational shocks.
One might be tempted to conclude from our findings that publication of the lead-
ing indicator index is socially counterproductive. We feel, however, that our results do
not in fact justify this conclusion. We say this for two reasons. First, publication of the
index potentially results in benefits due to agents in the economy being better informed,
and it is possible that these informational benefits outweigh any costs associated with
the expectational shocks identified here. Second, if the index was not published then
agents would look elsewhere for information concerning future aggregate activity
and, depending on the reliability of these alternative sources of information, this could
in fact lead to larger expectational shocks than the ones we have identified.
Finally, there are many directions in which the analysis in this paper could be
extended. One interesting issue that we discussed earlier is whether we have found a
pure sunspot type of expectational shock or whether information about real funda-
mentals plays an important role. We have found a pure sunspot type of shock if the
initial announcements of the leading indicator index contain no information about the
real fundamentals of the economy. In this case, agents pay attention to the initial
announcements of the index because each agent believes that other agents will look at
the initial announcements in forming their beliefs. Alternatively, agents could look at
the initial announcements of the index because those announcements contain infor-
mation about movements in the real fundamentals of the economy. In future work we
plan to investigate which of these two mechanisms is at work.
NOTES
We would like to thank Frank Diebold, Ken Koford, Ken Sokoloff, two anonymous referees,
participants at a workshop at UCLA, participants at the EEJ conference on macroeconomic coor-
dination failures at Middlebury College, and especially Ramsey Shehadeh for helpful comments.
1. Other papers on these topics include Woodford [1986; 1990], Bryant [1987], Haltiwanger and
Waldman [1989], Cooper and Haltiwanger [1990; 1996], Oh and Waldman [1994], Sethi and Franke
[1995], and Bomfim and Diebold [1997].
2. Starting in December 1995, responsibility for the index was moved from the U.S. Department of
Commerce to the Conference Board. Since our study covers the period 1968-1990, the U.S.
Department of Commerce was responsible for the index during the whole period of our study.
3. To be precise, after 1976 the initial announcements were significant at the 99 percent level in the
regressions concerning growth rates one and two quarters following the announcement dates,
while the initial announcements were significant at the 90 percent level in the regression concern-
ing growth rates three quarters following the announcement dates.
4. For a more detailed description of the revision process see U.S. Department of Commerce [1984].
5. After the major definitional change of the leading indicator index that took place in January 1989,
there were no longer components for which no information was available at the time of the initial
announcement.
6. We have also run our tests using the median forecasts, and there was no change in the qualitative
nature of the results.
7. The index of leading economic indicators is constructed to signal changes in the direction of
aggregate economic activity, where a variety of statistical series are used to measure economic
activity. These series include both industrial production and GNP. See Zarnowitz and Boschan
[1975] for a discussion. Note that most previous studies of the predictive power of the index have
focused on the ability of the index to predict either industrial production or GNP.94 EASTERN ECONOMIC JOURNAL
8. Our analysis does not cover more recent quarters because the ASA-NBER survey was discontin-
ued in 1990.
9. Note that we have also run our tests including Et – 1(IPt + j) as an explanatory variable rather than Et – 1(IPt + j – 1).
This did not change the qualitative nature of the results, but with this alternative specification
there was significant serial correlation among the residuals.
10. See the end of this section for a discussion of one scenario in which the other information
considered by respondents is correlated with both  It
F  and Rt.
11. One question that could be asked is whether the coefficients on Rt could be affected by a
multicollinearity problem between  It
F  and Rt. The correlation coefficients between these two
variables are 0.518 for the full sample, 0.750 for the pre-1976 subsample, and 0.280 for the post-
1976 subsample. Hence, to the extent that multicollinearity between these two variables is affect-
ing our results, the effect should be weakest in the later time period where we find the strongest
evidence for a negative relationship between expectations and revisions of the index.
12. In calculating the proportion of the residual variability that is explained by the revision variable,
we have also let Et – 1(∆IPt + j) be the one-period lag in expectations rather than Et – 1(∆IPt + j – 1). This
did not change the qualitative nature of the results, but with this alternative specification there
was significant serial correlation among the residuals. Finally, analysis indicates there is little or
no correlation between the revision variable and the other explanatory variables. Hence, our
incremental contribution approach by comparison of R2 values should provide an unbiased esti-
mate of that part of the residual variability that is explained by the revision variable.
13. We would like to thank Russell Cooper for suggesting this explanation to us.
14. This is easy to see in the following case. Suppose that there is a positive correlation between the
errors in the initial announcements and the surprises in the initial announcements, while there is
no correlation between the true values and the surprises. Further, assume that each forecaster
only considers his or her previous forecast and the current surprise in making this period’s
forecast. In this case we would expect the coefficient on the revision variable in our tests to be
negative since a more positive revision means a more negative error, which translates on average
into a more negative surprise. On the other hand, given no correlation between the true values for
the index and the surprises, we would expect the coefficient on the final announced values of the
index to be close to zero, since a higher true value would have no effect on the expected value of
the surprise.
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